装备物资供应链构建初探

从供应链及供应链管理理论的思想角度出发 ,构建了装备物资供应链的结构模型 ,分析了其所具有的一些基本特征 ,为装备物资供应的胜利实施提供了一个新的思考方向     

涂覆型RAM的研究现状和发展趋势

涂覆型ＲＡＭ 技术是隐身技术中的重要技术之一,并在隐身武器系统中得到广泛应用。首先分析阐述了涂覆型ＲＡＭ 的重要地位,然后介绍了铁氧体ＲＡＭ、超细金属粉末ＲＡＭ、高分子聚合物ＲＡＭ 的研究和应用现状。最后介绍了手性材料、纳米材料、多频谱ＲＡＭ 及智能隐身材料的最新研究状况     

自润滑材料工作机理验证与材料再生

在研究含油量低(HDV6)、中(HDV12)、高(HDV20)3种材料的滑动摩擦特性基础上,通过实验验证了自润滑材料工作机理;并发现自润滑材料失去自润滑特性后,通过对其重新浸油,可以使材料的自润滑性能再生.     

冲激雷达抗 RAM能力的实验研究

本文用实验方法从频域和时域两个方面研究了涂覆吸波材料目标的电磁散射,结果表明超宽带信号比常规雷达的窄带信号对付涂覆吸波材料目标有10～12dB好处,说明超宽带信号的确具有抗窄带吸波材料的良好能力。     

现代水面舰船结构发展的若干问题

本文综述现代水面舰船结构的若干进展,从舰船结构材料、结构型式以及舰船生存能力等方面进行评述。     

充电法在复合材料静电测试中的问题

按照GJB2605－96中有关静电衰减性能测试的要求,自制了复合材料静电衰减性能测试装置。用这套测试装置对9种不同结构的复合材料进行了实验研究。研究表明,利用充电法测试材料静电衰减性能时,由于电容效应,测试结果不能正确反映被测材料的静电性能。     

固体发动机药柱正交各向异性材料参数灵敏度分析

<正>交各向异性材料已在大型固体发动机上得到广泛应用。为了较大地降低发动机药柱的VonMises应变水平,极大地提高发动机的结构完整性能,以星形药柱为例,对固体发动机药柱推进剂和绝热层的弹性模量和泊松比等正交各向异性材料参数进行了灵敏度分析,得到了固体发动机药柱正交各向异性材料参数的灵敏度系数。分析方法与结论对固体发动机的优化设计具有指导作用。     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

FACILITATING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: Verified Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks and Production

Unprecedented interest in seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament exists today; even some nuclear weapon states are looking for new ways to strengthen this process. National declarations of fissile material holdings—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—could play an important role in supporting this effort, facilitating not only transparency but also the irreversibility of the process. This article discusses what kind of content such declarations could have in order to be meaningful and effective, the sequence of data on fissile material holdings that states might release, and some of the challenges to be expected in reconstructing historic fissile material production; it also summarizes current attitudes of weapon states toward making such declarations. Initial declarations can be valuable as confidence-building measures, but better and more background data are necessary if declarations are to serve as the groundwork for deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals. A robust verification approach would ultimately require inspectors to have access to fissile material production and storage sites. The methods and tools of nuclear forensic analysis—in this context also dubbed nuclear archaeology—would be a key element of this process. This article discusses the capabilities and limitations of potential approaches to verifying declarations of historic production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium; it also identifies and discusses opportunities for further research and development.     

STRATEGY FOR A NEW NUCLEAR AGE

Current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, force structure, and doctrine contribute to the threat of nuclear terrorism in several ways. First, the U.S. nuclear stockpile presents opportunities for nuclear terrorists to seize the materials they need. Second, U.S. nuclear forces remain a key justification for Russia's maintenance of similar nuclear forces that are less well protected. Third, America's continued embrace of nuclear weapons encourages and legitimizes other states to seek nuclear weapons that they will have difficulty securing from terrorists. The national security interests of the United States would be better served by a strategy to shrink the global footprint of nuclear weapons and provide the highest possible levels of security for the most minimal possible deterrent forces. Given the inability to secure nuclear weapons and materials perfectly or to eliminate terrorism in the foreseeable future, reducing the global inventory of nuclear weapons and materials is the most reliable way to reduce the chances of nuclear terrorism.